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France’s African forever war The country has been fighting jihadis in the Sahel for six long years — and there's no end in sight

A French soldier launches a mini-drone in Burkina Faso. Credit: MICHELE CATTANI/AFP via Getty Images

A French soldier launches a mini-drone in Burkina Faso. Credit: MICHELE CATTANI/AFP via Getty Images


July 31, 2020   6 mins

There is something inescapably Beau Geste about France’s Operation Barkhane. Today, as yesterday and as tomorrow, combat patrols from the French Foreign Legion and other regiments of the French Army will set out into the sand and scrub of sub-Saharan Africa searching out jihadists attached to al-Qaeda and Isis.

France has now been waging war in the no man’s land of the Sahel for six long years. Barkhane began on 1 August 2014, with a mandate for counter-insurgency ops across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger — an area the size of Europe. But in the Sahel, the terrorists can run and they can hide. Initially, the French deployment was 4,500 troops — with the Legion heavily committed, as always — but this year President Macron boosted the troop numbers of President Hollande to 5,100. Political Left to political Right, Barkhane is a French commitment. For now.

Ostensibly, the French work alongside the Sahel’s national armies and the peacekeepers of the United Nations’ Minumusa stabilization mission in Mali. For months Paris has been trying to build support in Europe and the West for a multinational special ops “Task Force Takuba”. Only Estonia and the Czech Republic have confirmed allocation of personnel; Britain, meanwhile, contributes a paltry three Chinook helicopters to Barkhane; Denmark two Merlin helicopters; the US declines the invitation to the party, again and again.

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Barkhane is France’s show. No one else has the stomach for counter-terrorism in the dust and heat and the vastness of the Sahel, not after Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. The other countries of the West barely report the operation, let alone support it. Barkhane is France’s lonely war.

The financial cost to La Belle France of Barkhane is a breath-sucking 600 million euros per annum. After all, soldiers need to be fed, equipped, and supported by Mirage 2000 jets, Tigre attack helicopters, Reaper drones, and conveyed by 380 trucks and 500 armoured vehicles. The cruel desert is endless.

So is Operation Barkhane, which has become France’s never-ending war.

The insurgency in the Sahel began in Mali in 2012, when a Tuareg separatist uprising was exploited by al-Qaeda-linked extremists who seized cities in the north. With Mali tottering on the brink of collapse France, the former colonial power, began its military intervention, driving the jihadists from the urban centres. This success turned to catastrophe, however, because the militants morphed into mobile formations operating in rural areas, where they proved as easy to kill as the wind. The insurgency spread to central and southern regions of Mali and then into Burkina Faso and Niger.

The  jihadists in the Sahel come in 57 varieties, but the majority of their attacks are attributed to Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen  (JNIM), which formed in March 2017 and has sworn  allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Since May 2019,  rival Isis has  given its imprimatur in the Sahel area to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a split from Boko Haram.

Whether umbilically linked to Isis or Al-Qaeda, the jihadists make the sands run with blood.  More than 4,000 people were reported killed in jihadist attacks in the Sahel in 2019, and tns of thousands were displaced. The violence vortexes, year on year; recently the U.N, and Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that the Sahel insurgency now threatens the countries of West Africa.  The central states of Mali are in anarchy.

There is no ambiguity about Operation Barkhane. Paris does not dress it up as “peace-keeping” or “stabilisation”; French officials insist that Barkhane’s priority is counterterrorism and does not baulk at the targeted killing of key jihadist leaders. So far, two of the five founding leaders of  JNIM have been “neutralised” (but read “assassinated”). In order to pursue these aims, the French have negotiated a perhaps unprecedented military rite of passage whereby their forces can conduct offensive operations in other sovereign nations. Under this deal UN Security Council resolutions authorise French troops to “use all necessary means.”

According to the press communiques of the Ministère des Armées, there are tactical victories over the jihadists almost every month. Certainly, the pace of operations in the tri-border zone of Mali-Burkina Faso-Niger has increased since Macron doubled down on troop commitment. In January this year, French troops were killing a militant a day in the Liptako-Gourma area of the tri-border; since Barkhane began around 700 jihadists have been captured or killed.

Sometimes, though, the blood flows the wrong way. French operations in the Sahel have led to the death of 43 French military personnel, most recently Tojohasina Razafintsalama of the 1 RHP (1st Regiment de Hussards Parachustistes), killed in Mali on 23 July. Two other “red berets” were wounded in the same suicide attack by a jihadist driving a truck load of explosives. In the obligatory communiqué from the Elysee, President Macron said he “bows with deep respect to the sacrifice of this soldier, who died in the accomplishment of his mission in the service of France”.

And so half-way down the world the French are fighting the War on Terror that the rest of the West has retreated from. There is a terrible innocence to Barkhane. The French commander of Barkhane, General Pascal Facon has declared he can “easily” defeat the Islamists. “We shouldn’t underestimate them,” he said, but “we shouldn’t give them too much importance either.”

This is agonisingly naïve. Seven hundred jihadists may have been taken out of play, but that still leaves about 6,000 terrorists in the Sahel, and they know the lie of the bad lands. The combat patrols of the French rarely do. They drive hundreds of miles from their “temporary advance bases” deep in the desert, bouncing up and down in steel armoured cars and personnel carriers, in temperatures topping 40 degrees, seeing nothing but sand and acacia trees through their wrap-around sunglasses.

For hour after hour. There is looking for a needle in a haystack; then there is looking for jihadists in thousands of square miles of the Sub-Saharan Sahel. The red dust kicked up by the convoys can be seen for miles. The jihadists get prior warning, and melt away with  their AK-47s. Just recently, a French combat engineer was interviewed on television following  a search for a jihadist weapons cache, ending with the inevitable reply “the search didn’t find anything today”. It has become the mantra of  French officers interviewed about Barkhane — “We didn’t find anything”. They smile for the camera, but you can sense the frustration.

The jihadists find the patrols, however. The threat of ambush, in the desert and in the villages, is ever present. The jihadists may wear flip-flops but they mount viciously effective military operations, taking out the armoured personnel carriers with rockets; in January they attacked a static army base at Chinagodrar in western Niger, killing 89 soldiers and staff.

The Islamists can afford to spend lives and they can afford to spend money, being more than amply funded by crime. According to the Institute for Security Studies, these activities “mainly take the form of trafficking in weapons, drugs, motorcycles and fuel, along with cattle rustling, artisanal gold mining and poaching”.

Neither should it be supposed that the militants lack popular support. The national governments of the “Group of Five for the Sahel” — Chad, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger — are blighted by corruption and incompetence, and some in the villages think “Better the Islamist devil you don’t know very well than the governmental one you definitely do.” Unsurprisingly, the Islamists also frame Operation Barkhane as Imperialism Redux, so that the French are in danger of handing the Islamists the most dangerous weapon of all, the propaganda narrative of A War of Independence.

In terms of military evolution, France is where America was in 2001 with Afghanistan. No exit strategy, no plan other than fighting war with war. Meanwhile, the armies of the “G5 Sahel”’, supposedly supportive of Barkhane, are under-trained and under-equipped. On one training exercise, the French instructor discovered that his Malian army students had no idea what a compass was.

Barkhane, and its lack of effectiveness in bringing resolution, is starting to take its toll. Anti-French demonstrations in Bamako, the Malian capital, were regular fixtures before Covid, with Macron depicted as Hitler on placards.

Still, there is something distinctly, forlornly heroic about the operation. The French have a dislike of Islamism that is visceral, reflexive. The French are also psychologically comfortable in playing soldier in the Sahel. Last year in a bar in Saint-Maixent, where the French army has its NCO training base, I asked a corporal what was the purpose of Barkhane? He replied with a one-word answer “Bataclan.” His mate nodded over his glass of 1664 lager.

The theory is that, by fighting the jihadists in the Sahel-Saharan strip (“SSS” in military jargon), they will be unable to mount terror attacks in France like that of 13 November, 2015. Maybe, but only a fool would discount from France’s war ambitions the stopping of the flow of migrants to Europe caused by Malian instability, and protection of French uranium sources in the region. The French have admirably lofty philosophies, but they understand realpolitik.

Only a fool, too, would disavow the imperial murmurs that still occur in the heart of France. Macron may come over all Monsieur Union européenne, but France has an unrequited longing for its colonial past. You only have to watch the weather report on France 2  TV to see that; after giving the meteo for The Hexagon it proceeds to give the forecast for “France d’outre-mer”, the lingering imperial outposts, as far away as New Caledonia in the South Pacific. Or indeed, watch the annual Bastille Day display of military might parading down the Champs-Elysées.

In the vastness of the Sahel France gets to play out colonial memories as neo- imperial dreams. But this is the tragedy of Barkhane, that France most ambitious military effort since Algeria is turning into a nightmare, her own personal Afghanistan.


John Lewis-Stempel is a farmer and writer on nature and history. His most recent books are The Sheep’s Tale and Nightwalking.

JLewisStempel

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Paul Blakemore
Paul Blakemore
3 years ago

One can only imagine the wall-to-wall coverage there would be of this in The Guardian and BBC etc if it was a British operation: the ‘imperial obsession’ in action. As it is our enlightened European cousins putting boots on the ground in Africa: shhh…

Fraser Bailey
Fraser Bailey
3 years ago

‘The French have a dislike of Islamism that is visceral, reflexive.’

Then why is their own country home to countless Islamists? Either way, it’s the unspeakable in pursuit of the unbeatable. Some things never change.

jlewisstempel
JL
jlewisstempel
3 years ago
Reply to  Fraser Bailey
Jeremy Smith
Jeremy Smith
3 years ago
Reply to  Fraser Bailey

Because they have muslim migrants.
Just like we (every country in the world) have child abusers and molesters.
The berbers in France (Zidane) while theoretically Muslims are very much not interested in Islam.
The same thing for Kurds and Turkish Alevis in Germany.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago

A most Interesting resume of France’s latest military debacle.

It follows in the tradition of Indo-China, Algeria, and the lunatic bombing of the Greenpeace ship, ‘Rainbow Warrior’ in 1985, amongst other less well known fiascos.

Vive la France!

Jeremy Smith
Jeremy Smith
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

Yes, Vive La France!
Their contribution to humanity is second to none.

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago
Reply to  Jeremy Smith

Don’t you mean second to one….us?

Jeremy Smith
Jeremy Smith
3 years ago
Reply to  Mark Corby

Second to Greeks and Romans
1) Ancient Greeks and Romans
2) Britain (UK?), France, Germany
3) Italy (Italy + Rome = Number 1)

Mark Corby
Mark Corby
3 years ago
Reply to  Jeremy Smith

Yes, I think we can agree on that.

Phil Gurski
Phil Gurski
3 years ago

Islamist terrorism, or any form of terrorism, will never be ‘defeated’ by the military alone. I wrote a whole book on this a few years ago (An End to the War on Terrorism: Rowman and Littlefield 2018). Yes, there is a role for the military and yes a dead terrorist is a good terrorist but ‘defeating’ terrorism is much more complicated than sending out patrols and carrying out drone/air strikes.

Andrew Fisher
Andrew Fisher
3 years ago
Reply to  Phil Gurski

I am sure your book is interesting and well argued, and of course military means purely on their own may not be effective, but I believe terrorism has sometimes been largely militarily defeated. For example ETA in Spain. Probably the provisional IRA as well. The Sahel does seem to be a difficult region to do so however, though it is on Europe’s doorstep. And such a radical ideology as extreme Islamism, with absolutely no concern about the deaths of their own ‘soldiers’ let alone anyone else’s, works in their favour. Do you have any particular suggestions? Do the French and the West have other strings to their bow?

While I can see the French approach might not work, what is to be done in the face of this truly evil ideology? I rather admire the robustness of the French at least in their foreign policy, though they have a huge internal issue with many of their muslim population hating their own country and routinely applauding terrorist attacks. (I have a friend who is a secondary school teacher in Paris who tells me this). In the UK we live in an increasingly naive and hand wringing society where we think our terrorist enemies should be put on trial, which is not generally feasible because of the difficulty of gaining ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ evidence. ISIS et al think of it as a war, even if many westerners don’t. Human rights activists would anyway be arguing for all sorts of extenuating circumstances and for the shortest possible sentences for any convicted. Let’s see for example what now eventually happens to that wretched woman Shamina Begum.

Bill Brookman
Bill Brookman
3 years ago

We appear to be well-into unending wars. Napoleon’s battles lasted 1-2 days, WW1’s were months, now multiple years. I suspect two reasons: technology permitting the troops to be re-supplied ad infinitum, and a more disturbing one: that whenever one side or another is about to lose, the West worries about the civilians, mounts humanitarian convoys and the whole shooting-match gets re-invigorated. What is a sure-fire way to bring peace? Victory by one side or the other.

(Always enjoy your writing, John.)

David Simpson
David Simpson
3 years ago
Reply to  Bill Brookman

I think France was more or less continuously at war from about 1794 to 1815 – hardly one or two days!

Jeremy Smith
Jeremy Smith
3 years ago
Reply to  Bill Brookman

There is always the Mongol solution

R S Foster
R S Foster
3 years ago

…I believe you’ll find that the UK is about to deploy troops to support the French in the Sahel…a “Long Range Reconaissance Group” based on troops from one of the light cavalry regiments

Fraser Bailey
Fraser Bailey
3 years ago
Reply to  R S Foster

Oh dear….more British body bags.

Charles Kovacs
Charles Kovacs
3 years ago

This is clearly a very difficult operation and France has done well to have had only 43 killed in six years of fighting. Given the nature of the battlefield, perhaps the successful British counter-insurgency campaign in Oman, may offer some lessons. As it is, according to Jane’s (27 Apr 20), the deployment of UK recon unit will be delayed till the end of the year as their camp won’t be ready till then.

sheybby
sheybby
3 years ago

It is not just Mali that is in trouble, Burkina Faso and Niger are walking the path that leads to state failure. The thing about Mali or Afghanistan or any other theatre of operation where a western power battles an insurrection is that it always end being caught in the “State-Making” trap.

France is not trying to fight terrorists. In reality, it is preventing its own creation “Mali and the whole Western Sahel region”to turn into failed States and be overrun by jihadist groups. The entreprise is doomed to fail because the Sahel States political and socio-economic structure is not sustainable.

If there is one thing to learn from European history, it is that strong and enduring State emerge spontaneously. In the 1980s, American sociologist Charles Tilly made the argument that European States were produced as unintended consequences of the competition between West European monarchs to control territory and capital. Externally, the State wages war against external actor in order to secure its access over a specified territory. Within the same territory, the state eliminates any potential rival that would challenge its will to use coercion to extract resources. The wars of the 18th and 19th centuries saw armies grew in size with the rise of standing armies and the development of strong national identities.

Charles Tilly argues that States created following the decolonization went through a different process of state-making and emerged from outside forces rather than inside ones. As a consequence, these states are creation of external actors something that impacts their military organization, the ability to collect taxes and more generally the organic relationship between rulers and ruled.

As it is the case of most African countries, due to a lack of legitimacy the Malian State has never been able to claim a monopoly of force, thereby pushing ruling elites to resort to clientelist strategies and militias to control the northern part of the country. As a consequence, it opened the gate for competing organizations to challenge its legitimacy. Strong states derive from the state’s ability to neutralize its rivals outside and inside its territory in order to sell protection and extract resources. Because they rely on their own forces, the jihadists are able to sell protection and build an administration to collect taxes within the territory they control. It is a recurring story, in many parts of the Islamic world, religious groups do a better job at being a “State” than national authorities.

If the Malian State legitimacy was to be assessed based on its ability to control its territory, Mali would be reduced to the Niger River. Generally speaking in Africa, rulers tend to be very fearful to be overthrown by a military coup. Therefore, they tend to make sure that the military command is filled with loyal friends, thereby undermining the capacities of their armed forces to do what they are supposed to do: waging war.

In 2013, the initial confrontation with the Tuareg rebellion demonstrated how the Malian defence forces were nothing more than a bunch of mercenaries. When the conflict broke out, the Malian army chain of commands completely collapsed and soldiers fled the battlefield without fighting. Eventually, the demise of the Mali’s armed forces engendered the collapse of the entire Malian State, forcing the French to intervene to protect its diaspora living in Bamako. Now France is stuck trying to rebuild something that cannot be.

By the late 1960s, American forces were staying in Vietnam not because they were in a position to win but only to prevent South Vietnam from being conquered by North Vietnamese forces.

Mali’s fall is written in the stars. As it is the case of most of the Sahel States, it is doomed to fail because in its current form, the Malian State has no legitimacy in the eyes of many segments of the population, especially in the North where French forces are deployed.

My country fas fallen victim to its own folie des grandeurs and the French ruling-class cannot accept that France is no longer in a position to enforce the Pax Francia in West Africa.